




The Infancy Defense in the Modern Contract Age:  
A Useful Vestige 
Victoria Slade† 
Most parents admit that teens can be baffling creatures. Whether 
slumped in front of the TV or locked away in a bedroom, tee-
nagers can be a formidable group—communication with them is 
no easy task, even for those who live within the same household.  
For companies looking to develop and market products to the 
younger generation, the challenge takes on added significance: 
teens are a complex group who can be a highly lucrative market.1 
Although children have long participated in the consumer mar-
ketplace, until recently they were bit players, purchasers of 
cheap goods. They attracted little of the [marketing] industry’s 
talent and resources . . . .  That has changed.  Kids and teens are 
now the epicenter of American consumer culture. They com-
mand the attention, creativity, and dollars of advertis-
ers . . . .  Yet few adults recognize the magnitude of this shift and 
its consequences for the futures of our children and our culture.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Today’s children are subjected to a constant stream of advertise-
ments.3  By age three or three-and-a-half, children start to believe that 
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 1. New Book Helps Marketers in “Getting Wiser to Teens,” TRU–TEENS, TWEENS, AND 
TWENTY-SOMETHINGS RESEARCH (June 21, 2004), http://www.tru-insight.com/pressrelease. 
cfm?page_id=214. 
 2. JULIET B. SCHOR, BORN TO BUY: THE COMMERCIALIZED CHILD AND THE NEW CONSUMER 
CULTURE 9 (2004). 
 3. Id. at 19–20.  American children view an estimated 40,000 commercials annually.  Id. at 20. 
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brands communicate their personal qualities, and by the time they start 
school, typical first graders can name 200 brands.4  Because of the in-
crease in their disposable income, children and teen consumers have 
been recognized as a huge market, and accordingly, advertisers have 
ruthlessly targeted them.5  What has emerged is the most brand-loyal, 
consumerist generation this nation has ever seen.6  At the same time, the 
process of entering into contracts is less formalistic, parties’ bargaining 
power is less equal, and consumers are far more likely to enter into an 
agreement without full knowledge of the terms.7  A contract that former-
ly took weeks of negotiation and hours of reading fine print may now be 
sealed merely through a click.8  Obligations can even arise when a user 
simply browses a website, without clicking anything.9 
Because of these concomitant trends, it is important to reexamine 
an antiquated legal principle designed to protect children: the infancy 
defense.  The infancy defense has existed for ages as a common law de-
fense to liability under a contract to protect those who are legally incom-
petent from entering into unwise bargains.  The doctrine essentially al-
lows children to avoid liability under unfavorable contracts.  This doc-
trine represents society’s concern that children are not capable of proper-
ly evaluating the risks and benefits of a contract and are, therefore, sus-
ceptible to manipulation by adults and businesses with more knowledge 
and bargaining power.10 
For almost as long as the infancy defense has been employed in the 
common law, commentators have speculated about its efficacy.11  
Among other things, critics have argued that children are often as, if not 
more, competent with technology than adults, making them too sophisti-
                                                            
 4. Id. at 19. 
 5. See generally Alan Chapell, What a Teen Consumer Wants, IMEDIA CONNECTION (Oct. 19, 
2004), http://www.imediaconnection.com/content/4423.imc; TRU–TEENS, TWEENS, AND TWENTY-
SOMETHINGS RESEARCH, http://www.tru-insight.com/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
 6. SCHOR, supra note 2, at 13. 
 7. Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for Using “Knowing Assent” as 
the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-For Terms in Standard Form Contracts, 31 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 469, 469–70 (2008). 
 8. ONLINE CONTRACT FORMATION 328 (N. Stephan Kinsella & Andrew F. Simpson eds., 
Oceana Publ’ns 2004). 
 9. Id. at 329 (“[T]he visitor to the website is deemed to have accepted the website owner’s 
offer by continuing to browse that website.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Halbman v. Lemke, 99 Wis. 2d 241, 245 (1980) (“Although the origins of the 
doctrine are somewhat obscure, it is generally recognized that its purpose is the protection of minors 
from foolishly squandering their wealth through improvident contracts with crafty adults who would 
take advantage of them in the marketplace.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, Deconstructing the Myth of the “Infancy Law Doctrine”: 
From Incapacity to Accountability, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 481 (1994); Robert G. Edge, Voidability 
of Minors’ Contracts: A Feudal Doctrine in a Modern Economy, 1 GA. L. REV. 205 (1967); Com-
ment, Liability of an Infant for Fraudulent Misrepresentation, 31 YALE L.J. 201 (1921). 
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cated to merit such protection.12  Critics have also accused the defense of 
functioning more as a sword than a shield, empowering children to bilk 
adults relying on their business legitimacy.13  Children become mature 
much earlier in these modern times, not just physically,14 but economi-
cally.15  They are provided many more opportunities to be economically 
productive members of society.16  For these reasons, many contend that 
the infancy defense is an anachronistic doctrine that stifles commerce 
and is unsuitable in modern society. 
Arguments against the infancy defense are prevalent, and their rea-
soning is reflected in myriad exceptions to the defense’s application;17 
however, these arguments are also flawed.  Their infirmity is that they do 
not address the fundamental problem of the balance of power between 
children and adults.  Additionally, these arguments do not consider the 
nature of the modern marketplace and contractual practices, or how ab-
rogation of the infancy defense might affect the behavior of the compa-
nies that deal with children.  Modern society, in which children purpor-
tedly no longer need protection, is fraught with consumerism,18 work-
and-spend economic cycles,19 enormous consumer debt,20 and vigorously 
targeted and aggressive marketing towards minors.21  With the increased 
control large corporations exert over everything we read, watch, and buy, 
minors are still a vulnerable group in need of protection.  An examina-
tion of modern contract practices, business marketing strategies, and typ-
ical consumer financial circumstances reveals that the infancy defense is 
not a vestige of a bygone era but, in fact, remains as important now as 
ever. 
Additionally, the infancy defense has grown and adapted to chang-
ing times.  Courts no longer rigidly apply a rule allowing minors to disaf-
firm; instead, they balance equities and employ a number of exceptions 
to the infancy defense.22  As long as the defense is applied judiciously, 
these exceptions answer concerns about the doctrine’s application in 
                                                            
 12. Juanda Lowder Daniel, Virtually Mature: Examining the Policy of Minors’ Incapacity to 
Contract Through the Cyberscope, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 239, 254–56 (2008). 
 13. Edge, supra note 11, at 205–06. 
 14. Michelle Roberts, Why Puberty Now Begins at Seven, BBC NEWS, May 15, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4530743.stm. 
 15. SCHOR, supra note 2, at 23. 
 16. SCHOR, supra note 2, at 23. 
 17. See infra Part II.A. 
 18. SCHOR, supra note 2, at 10. 
 19. SCHOR, supra note 2, at 10. 
 20. See THE FEDERAL RESERVE, FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE: CONSUMER 
CREDIT (2010). 
 21. See generally SCHOR, supra note 2. 
 22. See discussion infra Part II. 
616 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:613 
modern times.  And unlike a proposal to eliminate the defense, these ex-
ceptions address concerns regarding the infancy defense without dramat-
ically increasing the risk to youth who enter improvident deals. 
This Note argues that the state of a modern consumer society, when 
evaluated against the culture of marketing and consumerism surrounding 
America’s youth, calls for persisting protection of children in contract 
formation through retention of the infancy defense.  Part II of this Note 
introduces the infancy defense, the philosophy behind it, the various ex-
ceptions to the defense, and how these exceptions have adapted to the 
modern marketplace to assure equitable results for adults.  This Part also 
discusses other arenas of the law in which children are afforded special 
protection.  Part III addresses the current state of the infancy doctrine as 
demonstrated in the 2008 Virginia case A.V. v. iParadigms,23 in which 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dis-
missed high school students’ attempts to disaffirm an online contract un-
der the infancy defense, holding that the plaintiffs could not disaffirm 
because they had retained the benefits of the contract.24  Part IV replies 
to the predominant arguments against the infancy doctrine and explains 
why equitable concerns about the infancy defense’s impact on adults are 
unwarranted.  Part V examines the ongoing relevancy of the infancy de-
fense in light of technological advancements, suggesting ways in which 
minors continue to be vulnerable to more sophisticated adults and busi-
nesses.  This includes a discussion of the commercialization of childhood 
and the ways in which marketing companies target children in order to 
further the prevalence of materialism, consumer debt, and the earn-and-
spend lifestyle.  This Part also discusses the types of agreements that are 
prevalent online, such as adhesion contracts and clickwrap agreements, 
and argues that young people are particularly incompetent to consent to 
these forms of contracts.  Finally, Part VI concludes with the contention 
that the infancy defense is still important and should be retained with its 
current exceptions. 
II. THE LAW’S PROTECTION OF YOUTH 
A.  An Overview of the Infancy Defense 
The infancy law doctrine is one of the most venerable traditions in 
the common law.25  It represents society’s determination that minors lack 
                                                            
 23. A.V. v. iParadigms, Co., 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008). 
 24. Id. at 481. 
 25. “The right of an infant to avoid his contracts is an absolute and paramount right, superior to 
all equities of other persons, and may therefore be exercised against bona fide purchasers from the 
grantee.”  1 J.I. CLARK HARE & H.B. WALLACE, AMERICAN LEADING CASES: BEING SELECT 
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the mental capacity for a meeting of the minds—a requirement for con-
tract formation.26  The doctrine exists to protect minors from “foolishly 
squandering their wealth through improvident contracts with crafty 
adults who would take advantage of them in the market place.”27  Under 
the traditional common law infancy doctrine,28 still largely in effect to-
day,29 contracts entered into by minors fell into one of three categories: 
“void, when clearly prejudicial to the child; voidable, when possibly in 
the child’s best interest; and valid, when clearly in the child’s best inter-
ests.”30  Today, the doctrine is simplified with a general rule that all con-
tracts entered into by minors can be disaffirmed by the minor before 
reaching the age of majority.31 
The common law has grown to include several exceptions to the in-
fancy defense. The two most significant and generally accepted excep-
tions are contracts for necessaries and contracts in which the minor has 
retained a benefit.  The first precludes invocation of the infancy defense 
in minors’ contracts for necessaries.32  What constitutes a necessary is 
not fixed, but depends upon factors such as the child’s standard of living 
and individual circumstances, and the child’s ability to obtain necessaries 
from his or her parent or guardian.33  The adaptability of this definition 
of necessaries serves to protect those adults who, in good faith, enter into 
contracts with minors and provide them what they need to survive. 
The other most common exception to the infancy doctrine is the 
benefits exception, which states that a minor will be liable on a contract 
if she has retained a benefit.34  The infancy defense allows minors to dis-
affirm contracts on the condition that they make restitution of benefits 
                                                                                                                                     
DECISIONS OF AMERICAN COURTS, IN SEVERAL DEPARTMENTS OF LAW: WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE 
TO MERCANTILE LAW: WITH NOTES 264 (2d ed. 1851); Myers v. Saunders’ Heirs, 7 Dana 506, 521 
(1838); Hill v. Anderson, 13 Miss. 216, 224 (1845). 
 26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §17 cmt. c (1981) (referring to the manifestation 
of mutual assent element as a “meeting of the minds”). 
 27. Halbman v. Lemke, 99 Wis. 2d 241, 245 (1980). 
 28. REUBEN M. BENJAMIN, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE AMERICAN LAW OF CONTRACT 
51, 132 (2d ed. 1907) (“The following persons are incapable wholly or partially of binding them-
selves by contract: Minors. Persons of unsound mind. Drunken persons. Persons under conservators. 
Corporations.”). 
 29. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.3 (4th ed. 2004). 
 30. DONALD T. KRAMER, 1 LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN §10:1 (rev. 2d ed. 2005). 
 31. Id. 
 32. This concept first arose in Zouch v. Parsons, in which the court held that children were 
liable for their contracts for life-supporting goods on the “ground of necessity.”  (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 
1103 (K.B.) 1107; 3 Burr. 1794. 
 33. Rodriguez v. Reading Hous. Auth., 8 F.3d 961 (3d Cir. 1993) (public housing authority 
was justified in refusing to lease to the plaintiff, who was a minor single parent, because housing 
might not be a necessary and the minor could disaffirm the lease). 
 34. 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 9:14 (4th ed. 2009).  Based on unjust enrichment, this 
exception prevents minors from unfairly profiting from their transactions. 
618 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:613 
received.35  This doctrine is criticized because it can allow minors to re-
turn goods in far worse shape than they received them.36  One might ar-
gue that the long-standing nature of the infancy doctrine generally means 
an adult transactor should be on notice that a contract with a minor is not 
enforceable;37 however, courts have responded to critics’ concerns, and it 
is widely understood that a refusal to allow disaffirmance where the ben-
efits retained are not returnable would be inequitable.38  In these cases, 
courts enforce the contracts with minors on the basis that the minors have 
retained the benefits of the contract.39 
Though the benefits exception arose as a means of ensuring fairness 
to adult parties contracting with minors, it should be used judiciously, as 
its application can also create inequitable results for children.  This is 
often the case when the contract is for intangible goods because they are 
impossible to return.40  An example of a dubious modern application of 
the exception appears in A.V. v. iParadigms, in which the court stretched 
the notion of “benefit” to nearly absurd limits and then refused to allow 
disaffirmance because the plaintiffs could not return the benefits they had 
received.41  Despite this application, the benefits exception, when proper-
ly applied, is useful because it gives adults some security that they will 
not be taken advantage of when transacting with minors. 
The necessaries and benefits exceptions are the predominant excep-
tions from the infancy defense, but other minority rules have cropped up 
in numerous states.42  The growing number of exceptions is further proof 
                                                            
 35. DiMatteo, supra note 11, at 490. 
 36. DiMatteo, supra note 11, at 491 (“[The benefits exception] is an unholy compromise at 
best.  A minor is still allowed to disaffirm a contract, significantly waste away or destroy the good or 
service, and still only be held accountable for an amount based on the nebulous notion of ‘the benefit 
received.’”). 
 37. “He who deals with an infant deals at his peril, and subject to this right of the infant to 
disaffirm and avoid the contract.”  Mustard v. Wohlford’s Heirs, 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 329, 340 (1859). 
 38. See 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 9:16 (4th ed. 2009) (“The prevailing rule, which allows 
an infant to rescind an executed transaction without restoring what the minor has received, may often 
result in gross injustice.”). 
 39. See infra Part II. 
 40. See, e.g., Sheller ex rel. Sheller v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 150 (N.D. 
Ill. 1997).  In a highly questionable decision, two minors who were employed by the defendant and 
allegedly sexually harassed during their employment could not disaffirm an arbitration provision 
contained in their application for employment.  The Sheller court ruled that the fact that the plaintiffs 
were minors was irrelevant because if the minors had never signed the application with the arbitra-
tion provision, they could not have been hired, and therefore, allowing the minors to disaffirm the 
contract would permit them to retain the advantage of the employment that entitled them to bring the 
Title VII action while disaffirming the entire basis of their employment.  While it is generally true 
that a minor cannot disaffirm a contract while retaining its benefits, it can hardly be said that sexual 
harassment is a benefit of employment. 
 41. A.V. v. iParadigms Co., 544 F. Supp. 2d 473, 473 (2008).  See discussion infra Part III. 
 42. DiMatteo, supra note 11, at 492. 
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that the doctrine is in danger.  These include “the depreciation rule,” the 
“status quo rule,” the “emancipation doctrine,” the “misrepresentation of 
age rule,” and the “business rule.”43  An analysis of each varying excep-
tion is beyond the scope of this Note, yet these exceptions show that 
states have chipped away at the infancy defense, creating exceptions to 
protect adults in a variety of situations while leaving minors increasingly 
unprotected. 
B.  Other Ways in Which Children Are Protected Under the Law 
Children are afforded special protection under the law in several 
areas.  Underlying the various protections for minors is an understanding 
that children lack capacity in ways adults do not and a corresponding 
uncertainty as to how to deal with that fact.44  Different fields of law vary 
as far as what the determining factors are for capacity; however, each 
arena weighs protecting children and their position as less mature and 
rational actors against society’s interest in treating them like adults.  One 
of the important factors to be assessed is the nature of the minor’s activi-
ty.45  The weight of this factor is evident in contract law specifically, 
where the nature of the bargain struck determines, in large part, whether 
the court will view the child as a competent actor capable of consent.46 
Many areas of law recognize that minors do not have the same ca-
pacity for decision making as adults.  For instance, in criminal law, a 
minor’s consent to sexual contact does not absolve that minor’s sexual 
partner.47  Similarly, juvenile criminal defendants are, for the most part, 
treated differently than adult offenders.  For example, juveniles are not 
considered to have the capacity to make rational choices punishable by 
death.48  In tort law, the reasonable person standard is altered for child-
                                                            
 43. DiMatteo, supra note 11, at 492. 
 44. Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and Consistent 
Vision of Children and Their Status Under Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 275, 277 (2006) 
(“The law of children has developed in a patchwork and inconsistent fashion.  Decisionmakers in-
cluding Congress, state legislatures, the Supreme Court, and state courts have created laws and de-
cided cases without a comprehensive vision of what it means to be a child or how children think and 
behave.”). 
 45. Id. at 279 (“‘Competency’ according to the noted bioethicists Beauchamp and Childress is 
‘the ability to perform a task.’  Competency is therefore relative to the task that is being consi-
dered.”). 
 46. See discussion of the necessaries doctrine, supra Part II.A, explaining that the nature of the 
item bargained for will, in many cases, determine whether the child will be held liable. 
 47. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 (1985).  Under the Model Penal Code, it is a felony to engage 
in consensual intercourse where the victim is less than sixteen years old and the actor is at least four 
years older than the victim.  Id. 
 48. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the death penalty should not be used 
on juveniles); see also Charles Lane, 5–4 Supreme Court Abolishes Juvenile Executions, WASH. 
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ren; instead of behaving as a reasonable person would, the defendant 
must have acted with the amount of care to be expected from a child of 
that age and with those particular characteristics.49  Indeed, the special 
circumstances of children and their unique status under the law is manif-
est in many areas.  For this reason, it is not surprising that special rules 
apply to children’s dealings in the economic marketplace. 
III.  THE INFANCY DEFENSE TODAY: THE IPARADIGMS DECISION 
You grant iParadigms a non-exclusive, royalty-free, perpetual, 
world-wide, irrevocable license to reproduce, transmit, display, dis-
close, archive and otherwise use your Communications on the Site 
or elsewhere for our business purposes.  We are free to use any 
ideas, concepts, techniques, know-how in your Communications for 
any purpose, including, but not limited to, the development and use 
of products and services based on the Communications . . . .  Your 
sole remedy for dissatisfaction with the site, site-related services, 
and/or hyperlinked web sites is to stop using the site and/or those 
services.50 
Although the infancy defense is still in place as a necessary protec-
tion of children’s rights, courts are increasingly reluctant to disaffirm 
contracts on that basis.  In a recent example of a failed attempt to invoke 
the infancy defense, high school students in Fairfax, Virginia, and Tuc-
son, Arizona, were required to accept the above clickwrap agreement 
from Turnitin, a subsidiary of iParadigms, in order to submit their school 
work.51  Turnitin is an antiplagiarism program that helps combat the 
scourge of high-school plagiarism by maintaining a large database of 
submitted papers and comparing new submissions against those in the 
                                                                                                                                     
POST, Mar. 2, 2005, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A62584-
2005Mar1.html. 
 49. Critics of the infancy defense claim that treatment of minors in contract law should more 
closely resemble criminal law and torts, which generally act to hold minors more accountable for 
their actions.  See, e.g., DiMatteo, supra note 11; Daniel, supra note 12.  What these critics do not 
address, however, is the presence in criminal law and tort law of an innocent and victimized party 
and of harm.  Accountability in those arenas is more vital because of society’s interest in retribution 
or an individual’s interest in compensation.  In contract law, both parties are assumed to have con-
sented to the bargain.  Absent reasonable reliance on a misrepresentation of age (discussed infra Part 
IV.), the adult dealing with a minor has knowingly accepted the risk of later disaffirmance. 
 50. Usage Policy, TURNITIN, http://www.turnitin.com/static/footnote/usage_policy.html (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
 51. A.V. v. iParadigms Co., 544 F. Supp. 2d 473, 473 (2008).  Clickwrap agreements are a 
form of online contracts that came into use when software vendors began to distribute software 
preinstalled or downloaded over the Internet.  “Upon downloading, installation, or first use of the 
program, a window containing the terms of the license opens for the user to read.  The user is asked 
to click ‘I agree’ or ‘I do not agree.’  If the user does not agree, the process is terminated.”  ONLINE 
CONTRACT FORMATION, supra note 8, at 328. 
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database to detect copying.52  The program prepares an originality report, 
which is submitted to the teacher to use in evaluating the students’ 
work.53  To submit assignments, students must agree to the terms, mean-
ing their papers must become part of Turnitin’s database subject to the 
terms shown above.54  The plaintiffs in iParadigms clicked “I Agree” to 
be able to submit their papers for grades.  But, in an attempt to prevent 
collection of their written works, they included a disclaimer on the face 
of the documents indicating that they did not consent to Turnitin’s arc-
hiving of the work.55  Nevertheless, Turnitin archived the work, and the 
students brought an action for copyright infringement.56 
The district court found for the defendant on a number of grounds.57  
Regarding the plaintiffs’ assertion of the infancy defense—that they 
should be permitted to disaffirm the contract because they were minors 
when they accepted the terms and agreements58—the court found this 
doctrine not applicable because the plaintiffs had retained the benefits of 
the contract.59  Yet the retained benefits the court cited were meager: 
“They received a grade from their teachers, allowing them the opportuni-
ty to maintain good standing in the classes in which they were enrolled.  
Additionally, Plaintiffs gained the benefit of standing to bring the present 
suit.”60  This denial of the infancy defense, although based on an age-old 
doctrinal exception, relies on considerable creativity in defining the word 
“benefits,” leading several commentators to opine that this definition 
may mean the end of the utility of the infancy defense.61 
                                                            
 52. Stephen Sharon, Do Students Turn Over Their Rights When They Turn in Their Papers? A 
Case Study of Turnitin.com, 26 TOURO L. REV. 207, 212 (2010). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 214. 
 55. iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 478. 
 56. Id. 
 57. The case was subsequently appealed, and the plaintiffs lost again on the basis that Turni-
tin’s use of their written work was permitted under the fair use doctrine.  In reaching a decision on 
these grounds, the court did not address and, therefore, left intact the lower court’s ruling on the 
contract defenses.  A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 58. iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 481. 
 59. One commonly used exception to the infancy defense is when the child is deemed to have 
retained the benefits of the contract and is not able to return them.  5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, 
§ 9:6 (4th ed.).  This exception is covered in greater detail in Part III, infra. 
 60. iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 481.  Though there have not been any cases relying on this 
rationale since iParadigms, the idea that standing itself is a sufficient benefit to prevent disaffir-
mance is a serious threat to the ongoing strength of the infancy defense. 
 61. See, e.g., Claude Aiken, VA Court OKs Enforcement of Clickwrap Contract Against Mi-
nors, ZONKIO: NEWS, TECH LAW, WEB INSIGHTS, May 5, 2009, http://www.zonkio.com/va-court-
oks-enforcement-of-clickwrap-contract-against-minors_1525.html (“Under this test, any irrevocable 
benefit that happens as a result of the contract would suffice to destroy the infancy defense . . . .  In 
an age where services are migrating to the cloud and most services have extensive clickwrap con-
tracts attached to them, are we losing the infancy defense altogether?”); Jeff Neuburger, Are Click-
wrap Agreements with Minors Enforceable? The Fourth Circuit Won’t Say, But the District Court 
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The iParadigms decision illustrates both the modern view of the in-
fancy defense and one of the ways in which the exclusions to its applica-
tion have grown.  It also shows the extent to which youth lack bargaining 
power and the ability to make their own contractual decisions, thereby 
underscoring the need to protect them from improvident deals.  First, the 
court cursorily refused to apply the infancy defense because, it reasoned, 
the students had retained the benefits of the bargain.  As noted, these 
benefits were minimal.  Second, the students did not enter into the con-
tract with iParadigms in order to gain these benefits; rather, the benefits 
were thrust upon them. 
An expansion of the notion of benefits to include involuntary gains 
from one-sided contracts entered into against one’s will drastically broa-
dens the category of contracts to which the infancy defense does not ap-
ply.  The iParadigms court’s analysis exemplifies the modern disdain for 
the infancy defense and is consistent with a desire to effectively nullify 
it.  Further applications like this will contribute to the doctrine’s demise 
and leave youth unprotected in the economic marketplace. 
This case also shows how helpless children are without the defense.  
The student-plaintiffs in iParadigms did not wish to archive their work, 
and they communicated their intent not to be bound by writing declara-
tions to that effect on the documents they submitted.  They could not 
merely refuse to submit their documents as their teachers required them 
to use the site.  By enforcing the terms of the contract, the court furthered 
the injustice done to the students by taking away their one recourse, the 
infancy defense.  The students’ attempts to bargain with the company, 
and the court’s subsequent enforcement of the contract, show how the 
drastically uneven bargaining power impacts teens in the marketplace. 
Because of the threat to the infancy defense from precedent like 
iParadigms, which expanded the benefits exception beyond reasonable 
limits, the ongoing utility of the doctrine must be examined before it is 
lost entirely.  An exception to the defense that allows courts to enforce 
contracts when the minor retains benefits from a contract is fair.  If mi-
nors are willing participants in a contract and retain the benefits of the 
                                                                                                                                     
Said Yes, PROSKAUER: NEW MEDIA & TECHNOLOGY LAW BLOG, Apr. 
30, 2009, http://newmedialaw.proskauer.com/2009/04/articles/contracts/are-clickwrap-agreements-
with-minors-enforceable-the-fourth-circuit-wont-say-but-the-district-court-said-yes/ (“[T]he district 
court’s treatment of the infancy defense is very favorable to the enforceability of clickwrap agree-
ments executed by minors.”); Thomas O’Toole, Turnitin.com Lawsuit Yields Rulings on Browse-
wrap Contracts, Fair Use of Copyrighted Expression, E-COMMERCE AND TECH LAW, Mar. 18, 
2008, http://pblog.bna.com/techlaw/2008/03/turnitin-lawsui.html (“Some benefits.  The benefit of 
bringing a lawsuit that the court is tossing, and the benefit of participating in a high school anti-
plagiarism exercise.  This seems to be an awfully low standard.  Any Web site catering to children 
should be able to cite equally valuable ‘benefits’ from using their online services, so you have to 
wonder how much use the infancy defense will be to future online plaintiffs.”). 
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contract, then it is equitable to require them either to keep their promises 
or to return any benefit received.62  But the court’s treatment of this ex-
ception in iParadigms goes too far, effectively taking a symbolic step 
towards eradicating the defense altogether. 
IV.  THE CASE AGAINST THE INFANCY DEFENSE: OVERCOMING 
COMMON COUNTERARGUMENTS 
The perseverance of the infancy defense has been described as “a 
prime example of the retooling of an ancient doctrine to survive, at least 
in name, in a modern world whose social-economic matrix is far de-
tached from the normative and jurisprudential roots of this contractual 
restriction on the freedom of contract.”63  Commentators have been call-
ing for the end to the doctrine for decades, and the advent of the Internet 
seems only to have encouraged them.64 
This Part introduces and rebuts some of the common arguments 
against retaining the infancy defense.  First, critics argue the doctrine 
allows children to unfairly take advantage of adults, but this concern is 
unwarranted, as the doctrine has expanded to include numerous excep-
tions to protect adults.  Second, the argument that age is an arbitrary 
guide for capacity to consent fails because of the prevalence of such 
bright-line rules in various areas of law.  Third, the infancy defense does 
not reduce accountability and promote poor moral values among minors 
because the exceptions to the defense require children to make restitution 
of benefits received.  Finally, arguments that rely on children’s cognitive 
capacity oversimplify the issue and fail to consider the diversity of ma-
turity among children and the complexity of contracts.  Because these 
arguments fail to adequately justify leaving youth unprotected, the infan-
cy defense must be maintained. 
                                                            
 62. Similarly, the necessaries exception is fair.  If an adult provides a minor something neces-
sary for survival, that adult should receive the benefit of the contract.  Precluding the infancy defense 
in contracts for necessaries gives adults incentives to deal with minors in situations where it is the 
most important. 
 63. DiMatteo, supra note 11, at 482. 
 64. Daniel, supra note 12, at 254. 
Over forty years ago, a scholar noted, “The minor has long remained a special charge of 
the law.  But in our fast-moving and rapidly changing society, the ancient timeworn cloak 
of protection thrown over him has long since lost its real need or useful purpose . . . .”  
Since this observation was penned, society has experienced the technological revolution 
spurred by the proliferation of personal computers, the Internet, and MySpace.  Today, a 
new generation of computer-savvy minors sits confidently in front of their computer 
screens fearlessly and effortlessly initiating a multitude of contracts in cyberspace. 
Id. 
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A.  The Infancy Defense Does Not Give Minors an Unfair Advantage in 
the Marketplace 
A common complaint about the infancy law doctrine is that it pu-
nishes good faith adult transactors who accidentally deal with minors.65  
The commonly cited example is that a teen can purchase an automobile, 
destroy it, then disaffirm the contract and demand a full refund.66  Al-
though principles invoked in common law generally work to remedy ine-
quitable results when an adult has reasonably relied on a child’s misre-
presentation of his age,67 the Internet complicates this problem.  Busi-
nesses making contracts over the Internet have no real means of ensuring 
that the party with whom they are dealing is an adult,68 and it is extreme-
ly easy for even a young child to pretend to be an adult and engage in 
adult business activity online. 
The potential that children could take advantage of adults is a valid 
concern with the application of the infancy defense; however, courts deal 
with this problem when it arises by employing the numerous exceptions 
to the defense.  The flexibility of the common law has allowed courts to 
adapt the doctrine to the changing roles of minors.  As described in Part 
II, the concept of necessaries has grown to include a wide array of con-
tracts, and the notion of benefits has further restricted the types of con-
tracts minors can disaffirm.  Although the iParadigms decision expands 
this notion to an extreme level, rendering the defense practically mea-
                                                            
 65. See, e.g., DiMatteo, supra note 11. 
 66. See Halbman v. Lemke, 99 Wis. 2d 241, 247–50 (1980) (When the vehicle a minor had 
purchased broke down five weeks after sale, the minor was awarded his money back and was not 
required to pay the repair costs.  The court held that absent a misrepresentation of tortious damage to 
property, a minor who disaffirms a contract for purchase of an item which is not a necessity may 
recover his purchase price without liability for use, depreciation, damage, or other diminution in 
value.).  The strength of this example is, of course, tempered by the common requirement that child-
ren return all benefits received from a contract and the frequent requirement that the child also pay 
the obligee for any depreciation of the value of the item. 
 67. Most jurisdictions still allow children to disaffirm if they have misrepresented their age.  
But equitable principles like estoppel are more frequently being applied to enforce the contract when 
the adult party reasonably relied on the child’s misrepresentation, such as when the youth appeared 
to be an adult or was engaged in the business like an adult.  DiMatteo, supra note 11, at 496–97.  
Additionally, some states have statutes providing that minors may not disaffirm if they have willful-
ly misrepresented their age.  See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.1403 (1996) (forbidding person 
under eighteen from disaffirming contract if the person willfully misrepresented his age for the pur-
pose of securing the goods or loan of money, and if the seller had no actual knowledge of the mi-
nor’s true age). 
 68. Online contracts make reliance on external indicators of age extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, because “[e]lectronic contracts may never appear on a piece of paper, may involve in-
stantaneous transactions, may involve minimal or no negotiation or interaction, and may involve no 
human interaction at all.”  Donnie L. Kidd & William H. Daughtrey, Jr., Adapting Contract Law to 
Accommodate Electronic Contracts: Overview and Suggestions, 26 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. 
L.J. 215, 239 (2000). 
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ningless, courts can properly use these exceptions to ensure equitable 
results for adults who deal with minors.  Courts can continue to adapt the 
idea of what constitutes a necessary and what constitutes a retained bene-
fit in a manner that provides ample security to adults, while continuing to 
protect minors. 
Many of the arguments against retaining the infancy defense fail to 
consider the practical reality of the unlevel playing field between child-
ren and major corporations.  While predictions that minors will use the 
doctrine as a weapon to take advantage of adults may strike a chord with 
those who already maintain a healthy distrust of America’s youth, these 
predictions should be put into perspective.  It is true that teens are a large 
part of the consumer population, spending billions of dollars annually.69  
But these teens, cunning as they may be, are up against the likes of For-
tune 500 companies that spend billions of dollars annually on marketing 
efforts aimed at children.70  The true concern should be for children, who 
most likely are unaware of their legal rights under the infancy law doc-
trine and are dealing with large corporations with far greater bargaining 
power. 
Even if the infancy law doctrine was used as the proverbial 
sword—by that rare teenager who is even aware that such a doctrine ex-
ists—to harm the unsuspecting businessman, equitable relief is available.  
Although absolute age verification may be impossible, a requirement that 
users assert that they are of age, in conjunction with sophisticated beha-
vior by the minor, may suffice to support a claim that the adult’s reliance 
was reasonable and would be sufficient to cause a court to intervene.  
Decades of worrying about inequitable results for adults have worn some 
large holes in the fabric of the infancy law doctrine,71 and courts are pre-
pared to step in on behalf of the aggrieved and misled adult.  If the doc-
trine disappears, however, it is unclear who will step in when powerful 
corporations take advantage of their hold on youth culture and hook 
children into unwise bargains. 
B.  Bright-Line Rules Exist in Other Areas of Law and Are  
Not Inherently Suspect 
In addition to sufficiently protecting the interests of adults, the in-
fancy defense maintains its utility as a line-drawing mechanism, even 
though it functions as a bright-line rule in the midst of a complicated area 
of law.  Bright-line rules, such as age of consent, can always be criticized 
                                                            
 69. New Book Helps Marketers in “Getting Wiser to Teens,” supra note 1. 
 70. New Book Helps Marketers in “Getting Wiser to Teens,” supra note 1. 
 71. See Part II, supra, for a discussion of exceptions to the infancy defense. 
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as arbitrary;72 however, these and other distinctions must be and are 
made in numerous areas of law. 
Although bright-line rules can lead to undesirable results, they also 
provide benefits that outweigh their harms.  Critics of the infancy de-
fense decry the idea of a rule under which a party is completely incapa-
ble of consent one day, then magically gains competence on the next.73  
Nevertheless, there are numerous examples of bright-line rules regarding 
juveniles.  For instance, the country is satisfied with the same bright-line 
principles applying to driving, drinking, and sex.  Furthermore, legal his-
tory is replete with examples of apparently arbitrary line drawing be-
cause drawing the line at a particular age provides certainty and adminis-
trative efficiency.  For an overburdened justice system, a doctrine that 
draws a line at the eighteenth birthday is superior to one that requires an 
in-depth review of every individual minor’s cognitive capacity.  Not only 
does this sort of line drawing further judicial economy, but it also en-
hances predictability: companies will know what the likely results are 
when they transact with minors.  Therefore, the argument that age is an 
arbitrary distinction cannot support the eradication of the infancy de-
fense. 
C.  Preserving the Infancy Defense Does Not Encourage  
Immoral Behavior Among Children 
Concern for the moral integrity of America’s youth is also an un-
persuasive reason for eliminating the infancy defense.  The infancy de-
fense does not promote irresponsible conduct, as some claim.74  Critics 
argue that a doctrine that allows a child to knowingly enter a contract and 
then later disaffirm it without consequences contributes to the corruption 
of the minor, encouraging him to shirk responsibility and take advantage 
of adults.75  But the elimination of the defense jeopardizes children more 
                                                            
 72. DiMatteo, supra note 11, at 494 (“[T]he age of majority is simply an arbitrary dividing line 
between infancy and adulthood.  Furthermore, this dividing line is more a product of historical whim 
than based upon any meaningful distinction.”). 
 73. Daniel, supra note 12, at 256 (“Referring to a seventeen-year-old as an infant is just as 
preposterous as the notion that the cognitive decision-making ability mystically appears on his eigh-
teenth birthday.”).  Critics also contend that if the age of capacity can be an individualized inquiry, 
leading criminal courts to hold juveniles accountable as adults in certain situations and holding mi-
nors liable for their torts, there should not be a bright-line rule for contracts.  DiMatteo, supra note 
11, at 494 (“It seems anomalous . . . that youths of sufficient age and capacity . . . may be convicted 
of crime, and be held liable for their torts, and yet not be liable on their contracts when apparently of 
sufficient capacity to make them . . . .” (citing La Rosa v. Nichols, 105 A. 201, 203 (N.J. 1918)). 
 74. Daniel, supra note 12, at 257 (“More than anything, the current doctrine appears to provide 
conniving adolescents with a free pass, effectively discouraging any sense of accountability.”). 
 75. Dodson ex rel. Dodson v. Shrader, 824 S.W.2d 545, 550 (Tenn. 1992) (“[The infancy law 
doctrine] does not appear consistent with practice of proper moral influence upon young people, tend 
to encourage honesty and integrity, or lead them to a good and useful business future, if they are 
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than the retention of the defense, as eliminating the defense will result in 
unwitting children being subjected to manipulation by corporations.  Ad-
ditionally, even if a child is able to renege on a deal, the non-legal conse-
quences may be enough to deter such conduct. 
Parents are better sources for moral teaching than contract law.  It is 
incongruous to both take a paternalistic approach, purporting to protect 
children’s morals, and simultaneously insist that children be independent 
economic actors, capable of entering into contracts without parental con-
sent.  This is especially true when the result of this effort is to make 
children more susceptible to the efforts of companies that seek to en-
courage unhealthy lifestyles.76  Permitting children to avoid their con-
tracts may do less to degrade their morals than allowing them to freely 
enter contracts with credit card companies and spend money they do not 
have. 
Those who would abolish the infancy defense on moral grounds al-
so overlook the fact that a release of legal liability is not a release from 
all consequences.  Even if a minor is able to employ the infancy defense 
and disaffirm, this determination will be made after at least some degree 
of legal battle and will likely involve a return of any benefit received.  
Although the minor may not remain financially or otherwise bound by 
the agreement, the complex and negative legal experience would likely 
deter the minor from breaking any of his future commitments.  The link 
between the infancy defense and the alleged moral degeneration of 
America’s youth is tenuous at best. 
The infancy defense has been subject to many unfounded and unfair 
critiques.  It is charged with affording children under the age of eighteen 
an unfair advantage, even though the doctrine is worn thin with equitable 
exceptions to protect adults.  It is accused of being an exercise in arbi-
trary line drawing despite the fact that imposing age restrictions on child-
ren is common enough to have become mundane.  Worst of all, it is de-
scribed as contributing to the moral degradation of youth, despite the fact 
that it is one of the few doctrines keeping children under the economic 
supervision and care of their parents and away from the large companies 
drawn to the aroma of their pocket money.  The infancy defense should 
not be abolished; instead, it should remain in place as a protection for 
children who enter improvident contracts. 
                                                                                                                                     
taught that they can make purchases with their own money, for their own benefit, and after paying 
for them, and using them until they are worn out and destroyed, go back and compel the vendor to 
return to them what they have paid upon the purchase price.  Such a doctrine can only lead to the 
corruption of principles and encourage young people in habits of trickery and dishonesty.”). 
 76. See infra Part V.B for a related discussion on the trend of credit-card use among teens and 
young adults. 
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V.  WHY THE INFANCY DEFENSE IS STILL RELEVANT AND NECESSARY IN 
THE MODERN MARKETPLACE 
Despite its age, the infancy defense remains relevant in modern so-
ciety for many reasons.  First, children’s digital and technological apti-
tude does not make them as cognitively developed as adults.  Second, 
contemporary contract formation practices, such as form contracts that 
provide no opportunity to bargain and hidden agreements that can be ac-
cepted without a conspicuous manifestation of assent, belie a claim that 
even an advanced child is competent to contract.  Third, inequity in bar-
gaining power is very powerful in contracts with minors because young 
people are intensely targeted by large companies that carefully advertise 
products to appeal to them.  Finally, the issue of retaining the infancy 
defense is part of a larger struggle to protect America’s youth from fur-
thering what has become a harmful cycle of consumerism and debt. 
A.  Minors Need Protection Because They Are Not Cognitively Capable 
of Consenting to Transactions in the Modern Marketplace 
Children continue to require protection in the modern marketplace 
in part because of the reason they required protection through the infancy 
defense in the first place: children are cognitively inferior to adults.  A 
common argument against the retention of the infancy defense is that 
minors have the cognitive capacity to make contracts.77  Data suggest 
that minors have adult levels of cognitive functioning once they reach 
fourteen years of age,78 and it has been argued that minors become ra-
tional consumers well before reaching the age of eighteen.79  But these 
studies are not conclusive; there is also evidence that children are more 
impulsive than adults and lack the foresight necessary to evaluate the 
pros and cons of entering into a binding agreement.80  An important dif-
                                                            
 77. Daniel, supra note 12, at 252 (“In spite of the general sentiment that children are too imma-
ture to appreciate the significance of their acts, empirical data confirms that children are capable of 
understanding the nature of their legal rights and responsibilities considerably before reaching the 
age of majority.”). 
 78. CHILDREN’S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 245 (Gary B. Melton, Gerald P. Koocher & Mi-
chael J. Saks eds., 1983). 
 79. Daniel, supra note 12, at 267. 
 80. Catherine Sebastian, The Second Decade: What Can We Do About the Adolescent Brain? 
2, 4 (2007), available at http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/3330/ (“For example, teenagers have no trouble 
making the complex but automatic visual calculations necessary to work out when an approaching 
car will reach their location.  However, a teenager may decide that they have time to cross the road 
before it gets there, whereas an adult might decide to play it safe and wait.  This is of course a gene-
ralisation, but it illustrates that the most profound differences between adults and adolescents occur 
at the decision-making, or executive, levels of processing. . . . [F]indings from studies of risk-taking 
behaviour in the real world . . . [show] that adolescents are more likely than adults to engage in risky 
activities such as unprotected sex, reckless driving, and experimentation with drugs.  If, as the results 
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ference between adults and children lies at the decision making, or ex-
ecutive, level of processing.81  Even if children’s brains are fully devel-
oped before they reach age eighteen, they are still immature about deci-
sion making, which matters most for the purposes of the infancy defense: 
They are impulsive risk takers.  Furthermore, even those children who 
are especially advanced do not necessarily understand the realm of con-
tracts as well as adults and cannot weigh the costs and benefits associated 
with a complicated transaction. 
Cognitive function also does not equate to market sensibility for the 
purpose of contract formation.  Critics argue that minors’ technological 
savviness corresponds to a higher degree of sophistication and capacity 
to contract, particularly online, as children have been exposed to digital 
technology from an early age.82  Technological wherewithal, however, 
has little to do with an understanding of the cost-benefit analysis that 
adults employ when making a decision.  The problem is too complex to 
reduce to a statement that children are capable of consent at a certain 
age.83  The legal system’s apparent difficulty creating clear delineations 
of age-related maturity levels illustrates that one cannot so simply claim 
that minors are generally capable of contracting like adults without re-
gard to the nature of the contract at issue.84  The nature of the contract is 
imperative to determining contract capacity because the risk-assessment 
abilities that are critical for decision making are the areas where children 
and teens are most lacking.  This lack of risk-assessment ability is partic-
ularly problematic due to the types of contracts that proliferate the Inter-
net. 
The nature of online contract formation makes it difficult for con-
sumers to make informed decisions, regardless of their ages.  Even adults 
                                                                                                                                     
suggest, young people are less good at anticipating the outcome of events, perhaps they are unable to 
accurately appraise the risk levels when faced with a real-life choice.”). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Daniel, supra note 12, at 267. 
 83. Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of Development, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
143, 151 (2003). 
A body of research examining the relative decision-making capacities of adolescents and 
adults has emerged in recent years.  This work does not provide simple or conclusive an-
swers to the question of whether adolescent decision-making fits comfortably into predic-
tive categories.  Nor does it draw bright-line, age-determined dividing lines between ado-
lescence and adulthood.  Instead, this research suggests that cognitive and social devel-
opment occurs unevenly within and among individuals.  More importantly, this research 
challenges the claim that adolescents are fully responsible for the decisions that they 
make. 
Id. 
 84. Megan E. Hay, Note, Incremental Independence: Conforming the Law to the Process of 
Adolescence, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 663, 665 (describing the inconsistencies in treatment 
of minors across legal areas leading to a legal “hodge-podge” of laws affecting adolescents). 
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have greater chances of getting swindled when they have no opportunity 
to bargain and do not take the time to read the terms and provisions of a 
contract.  To the modern consumer, notions of offer and acceptance, ne-
gotiation, and even signing a literal document after reading its terms 
seem like quaint customs from a former age.  Modern contracts, particu-
larly when they are formed over the Internet, lack such formalities.  Cit-
ing convenience and decreased costs, companies are permitted to use 
form contracts offered to users on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, even if the 
terms were not disclosed until after the consumer had already agreed to 
the transaction.85  Courts have enforced license agreements when the 
consumer clicked “I Accept,” despite the consumer’s attempt to bargain 
for certain terms.86  In the current state of the law, even conduct less 
clearly manifesting assent, like merely browsing a website, can be suffi-
cient to form a contract.87  Although these evolving practices have been 
limited by courts that require that the individual accepting the offer be at 
least aware that there is an offer bound up in the website,88 the problem 
remains that contracts arise with little to no affirmative manifestation of 
assent and contain almost entirely unbargained-for terms. 
This lack of affirmative consent and inability to bargain for terms in 
a modern contract makes the marketplace perilous for minors.  Even if it 
were true that children are, in large part, capable of reaching a meeting of 
the minds and, therefore, competent to consent, this reasoning does not 
extend to the type of competence modern contracts anticipate.  Not only 
is this claim inapplicable to a group as diverse as minors and to an act as 
broad as contract formation,89 but also the nature of the reasoning in-
volved in accepting an online adhesion contract requires more than basic 
competency.  Recognizing that rational choices are not always behind 
consumers’ decisions in the marketplace,90 one author argues that a mi-
nor should still be accountable for a contract accepted without an under-
standing and rational evaluation of the terms because by blindly binding 
himself, a child is simply mirroring the conduct of a normal adult con-
                                                            
 85. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); Hill v. Gateway 2000, 
Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 86. i.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 87. Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (introducing the term 
“browsewrap” to mean an agreement formed by the conduct of a visitor to a website). 
 88. ONLINE CONTRACT FORMATION, supra note 8, at 330–31. 
 89. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 83, at 151–52.  “[M]ost psychologists conclude that cogni-
tive ability alone does not define or determine an individual’s decision-making capability.  Personal 
and environmental factors operate to influence an individual’s ability to make mature judgments.  
Factors such as uncertainty, stress, and cultural experiences may differentially enhance or impede 
decision-making capacity.”  Id. 
 90. Daniel, supra note 12, at 250–51. 
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sumer.91  In the modern age, it is a “rational consumer act” to place vo-
luntary limits on one’s own cognition.92  In a typical situation involving 
an online adhesion contract with a clickwrap agreement, the adult con-
tracting party “informally weighs the costs associated with obtaining and 
processing all relevant information against the foreseeable risks of hav-
ing to deal with an undesired event and chooses a satisfactory course of 
action as opposed to an optimal decision.”93  The decision to cross one’s 
fingers in a surge of optimism rather than take the time to read pages of 
fine-print legalese (a particularly compelling urge in the venue of the 
Internet, that arena of speedy transactions and instant gratification) is a 
new brand of rationality.  Such a decision, while acceptable for adults 
with years of experience with common contract provisions and of risk 
assessment, is not plausible for naive consumers like minors. 
Minors’ technological wherewithal does not equate to a significant 
awareness of what contract terms are standard and fair and which are 
outrageous.  People are not born with financial literacy.94  They lack an 
innate understanding of interest rates, overdraft and late charges, and 
building a good credit score.  They are not aware of mandatory arbitra-
tion provisions, terms prohibiting injunctive relief, or terms asserting 
jurisdiction.  Granted, many adult consumers may not have this aware-
ness either; however, adults are expected to accept the risks of their eco-
nomic pursuits, to research answers, to consult financial planners, and to 
otherwise ensure that they are getting a fair deal.  Children and teens, on 
the other hand, are enticed by rewards packages, design elements, celebr-
ity spokespersons, and other media assaults specifically designed around 
their blossoming interests,95 and they can easily fail to weigh the costs 
and benefits of a transaction.  With a parent as a guide and instructor, 
minors can certainly attain a level of consumer awareness that would 
                                                            
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Libby Wells, Card Issuers Target Teens for Latest Plastic Attacks, BANKRATE.COM, 
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/cc/20000508.asp (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Plastic 
Attacks]. 
Jump$tart, a nonprofit organization based in Washington, D.C., says these fresh young 
things aren’t ready for plastic.  Every other year, the group quizzes 12th-graders in public 
schools around the country on topics such as paying taxes, using credit cards and retire-
ment savings.  On average in 2006, participants answered only 52.4 percent of the ques-
tions correctly, a failing grade.  This was marginally better than the results of the 2004 
survey (52.3 percent).  The lowest was in 2000, when students scored an average of 50.2 
percent. 
Id. 
 95. See generally About TRU: Overview, TRU–TEENS, TWEENS, AND TWENTY-SOMETHINGS 
RESEARCH, http://www.tru-insight.com/about.cfm?page_id=41 (last visited Nov. 8, 2010); SCHOR, 
supra note 2. 
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constitute capacity to contract.  But if parents are not present or do not 
advise their children prior to the clicking of “I Accept,” children are en-
tering bargains woefully underinformed.96  Elimination of the way out 
for children who unwisely enter into contracts without parental consent 
puts minors—and their parents, who will, in many cases, acquire their 
children’s financial obligations—at the mercy of the companies who can 
afford to attract young consumers. 
B.  Minors Need Protection Because Their Prominence in the 
Marketplace Leads Large Companies to Target Them 
Minors continue to need protection, despite⎯or even because 
of⎯their marketplace prominence.  It is no secret that minors are 
plugged-in and spending.97  They are such voracious consumers that an 
industry has been born to help companies cater to them.98  Companies 
like TRU specialize in youth markets, and they encourage businesses that 
wish to deal with minors to use their services in order to “develop mea-
ningful connections with young people.”99  TRU’s customers are work-
ing to tap the youth market through advertising campaigns and outreach 
specifically designed to appeal to minors.  Catering directly to children’s 
                                                            
 96. Numerous sources indicate that children are largely unsupervised while using the Internet, 
particularly in poor and minority homes.  SCHOR, supra note 2, at 11.  Removing a child’s ability to 
disaffirm contracts entered into without parental consent would create a risk that children will, in 
ignorance of the nature or extent of the terms they are accepting, bind themselves to undesirable 
contracts.  This problem is particularly important because of the possibility of parental liability for 
these contracts.  Because children from disadvantaged families are the most likely to be uneducated 
on finances and to be unmonitored while online, the risk created by removing the infancy defense 
falls disproportionately on those families least able to absorb the cost. 
 97. Plastic Attacks, supra note 94.  “Jupiter Communications estimates that teens accounted for 
$1.2 billion in Internet spending by 2002.”  Id. 
 98. For example, TRU calls itself “the global leader in teens, tweens, and twenty-somethings.”  
About TRU: Overview, TRU–TEENS, TWEENS, AND TWENTY-SOMETHINGS RESEARCH, 
http://www.tru-insight.com/about.cfm?page_id=41- (last visited Nov. 8, 2010). 
 99. Id.  TRU describes itself:  
As an advocate for young people, TRU has provided critical direction for many of the na-
tion’s most prominent and successful social-marketing campaigns, helping to keep young 
people safe and healthy.  Our work has made a difference⎯from being put to use at the 
grass-roots level to being presented at the very highest levels of government. 
Id.  Despite this noble claim, TRU’s client list is riddled with the names of retail mega-corporations 
like Abercrombie & Fitch, Gap, American Eagle, Kmart, Nordstrom, Safeway, Target, and Victo-
ria’s Secret.  It also boasts of its service to The Coca-Cola Company, Frito-Lay, Kellogg, Kraft, 
PepsiCo, every major cell-phone company and sports association, several major auto makers, and 
disconcertingly, financial businesses like Visa, Discover Card, Allstate Insurance Company, Na-
tionwide Insurance, and Merrill Lynch.  About TRU: Client List, TRU–
TEENS, TWEENS, AND TWENTY-SOMETHINGS RESEARCH, http://www.tru-insight.com/ 
about.cfm?page_id=42 (last visited Nov. 8, 2010). 
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tastes, corporations lure minors into purchasing adult-type products, then 
offer unfair contract terms that children are likely to accept.100 
For example, credit card companies like CapitalOne solicit credit 
card applications from high school juniors and seniors through Internet 
advertising and mailings addressed to their parents.101  As of now, an 
application requires a parent signature; however, if the card company did 
not have the threat of the cardholders asserting the infancy defense, it is 
debatable that this requirement would remain.  With a 19.8% interest 
rate,102 credit card companies have a great deal to gain from consumers 
who have not yet learned fiscal responsibility.  As one journalist notes, 
“Many teens don’t know enough about borrowing to use a credit card, 
but issuers know a lot about [teens], and they want their business.”103  
This is just one example of the disparity in bargaining power between 
youth and large corporations, and the surge of advertising directed to-
ward young people is only increasing the divide. 
Although some parent groups oppose youth-targeted advertising, 
the idea of giving credit cards to children is gaining support.  Parents and 
consumer protection groups have reacted to the dangers of the Internet, 
providing advice to parents who seek to ensure their children behave res-
ponsibly while online and do not get taken advantage of.104  At the same 
time, however, sites have cropped up in support of the trend.  Credit Card 
for Kids, an informational credit card site, offers advice to parents select-
                                                            
 100. Plastic Attacks, supra note 94. 
Credit card companies, which keep a hawk’s eye on demographics, are swooping down 
on young consumers.  Initiating the quest for kids under age 18 is Capital One, one of the 
nation’s leading issuers.  The Virginia-based company is targeting high school juniors 
and seniors with a co-signed MasterCard that is solicited through the Internet and mail-
ings addressed to their parents.  The card has a stiff 19.8 percent fixed annual percentage 
rate and no annual fee . . . .  The child gets the card—and the bill—in his or her name, but 
the parents are legally responsible for the account. 
Plastic Attacks, supra note 94. 
 101. Plastic Attacks, supra note 94. 
 102. Plastic Attacks, supra note 94. 
 103. Plastic Attacks, supra note 94. 
 104. See, e.g., Safety Advice and Tools, SAFEKIDS.COM: ONLINE SAFETY & CIVILITY, 
http://www.safekids.com/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2010) (offering advice to parents about how to protect 
their children online); Safety Advice and Tips, CONNECT SAFELY, http://www.connectsafely.org/ 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2010) (encouraging safe online practices for children); Francoise Gilbert, Age 
Verification as a Shield for Minors on the Internet: A Quixotic 
Search?, 5 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 6 (2008), available at http://www.lctjournal.washington.ed
u/Vol5/a06Gilbert.html (suggesting that because age verification on the Internet is not technically 
feasible, parents must prevent their children from going online unsupervised and unprepared); About 
CCFC, CAMPAIGN FOR A COMMERCIAL-FREE CHILDHOOD, 
http://www.commercialexploitation.org/aboutus.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2010) (Home page of the 
Campaign for a Commercial-Free Childhood, an organization whose mission is to “reclaim child-
hood from corporate marketers.”). 
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ing their child’s first credit card.105  The site provides recommendations 
both about what a parent should watch out for when selecting a credit 
card (the ability to track spending online, discounts, and rewards that are 
tailored to children),106 and what brand of card to choose.107  It ends with 
the sage advice, “No one needs a credit card, but it is good to have it 
there in case you do.”108  A website such as this provides false comfort—
although it purports to help children make rational, adult choices, it is 
really focused on encouraging parents to take out another credit card on 
which they will pay interest.  The very presence of these sites encourages 
parents to believe it is appropriate for their children to amass credit card 
debt before they even finish high school.  These practices contribute to 
an atmosphere of commercialization and consumerism that is detrimental 
to America’s youth. 
C.  Minors Need Protection as a Matter of Social Policy 
What sites like Credit Cards for Kids do not address is the potential 
harm of exposing children to credit and consumerism at such young ages.  
Credit cards, while certainly prevalent, provide questionable benefits 
when used widely, particularly when used by the poor or those who do 
not manage their finances well.109  Without the infancy defense, minors 
are able to enter into credit card contracts at younger ages, meaning 
Americans will get an earlier start at accumulating debt.  It is not appro-
priate to indoctrinate children into a credit cycle that has left millions of 
Americans with serious debt.110  As of March 2009, the total U.S. con-
sumer debt was $2.55 trillion.111  Of this, revolving debt (or debt from 
credit cards, as opposed to loans for automobiles, education, etc.) made 
up $945.9 billion.112  The average credit card debt per household with 
                                                            
 105. CREDIT CARD FOR KIDS, http://www.creditcardforkids.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) 
(offers advice “to parents looking for credit cards for kids, teenagers, and college students”). 
 106. Id. 
 107. All featured recommendations are from Citibank.  Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Mike Konczal, How Credit Cards Rob the Poor to Spoil the Rich, THE ATLANTIC, 
Nov. 24, 2009, http://business.theatlantic.com/2009/11/frontline_special_the_card_game_tonight.ph
p. 
 110. JOINT ECON. COMM., U.S. CONGRESS, VICIOUS CYCLE: HOW UNFAIR CREDIT CARD 
PRACTICES ARE SQUEEZING CONSUMERS AND UNDERMINING THE RECOVERY (2009) [hereinafter 
VICIOUS CYCLE]. 
 111. Id. at 4. 
 112. Id.  In the fourth quarter of 2008, 13.9% of consumer disposable income went to service 
this debt.  Id. 
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credit debt is $16,007,113 and the average cardholder has more than three 
credit cards.114 
According to a report by Congress’s Joint Economic Committee, as 
the economy has weakened, Americans’ financial situations have only 
become worse.115  While the trend of credit cards among young people is 
rather new, the results in that arena are similarly disheartening, as large 
percentages of people under twenty-five are already saddled with signifi-
cant debt.116  The alarming figures above represent the consumer debt 
amassed when only approximately 60% of consumers report having a 
credit card.117  Recent reports show that approximately 84% of the over-
all student population has credit cards,118 and half of college undergra-
duates have four or more.119  Without the infancy defense preventing 
people under eighteen from forming contracts with credit card compa-
nies, the outlook is bleak. 
The increase in consumerism and credit card use among young 
people has negatively impacted young adults and will likely further im-
pact the futures of today’s children.  As one public policy research or-
ganization declares, “Debt has become a generation-defining characteris-
tic of today’s young adults.”120  The financial circumstances of these 
young adults are very different than for the same age group in previous 
generations.121  On the whole, young adults today are spending an alar-
                                                            
 113. Ben Woolsey & Matt Schulz, Credit Card Statistics, Industry Facts, Debt Statistics, 
CREDITCARDS.COM, http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-card-industry-facts-
personal-debt-statistics-1276.php (last visited Apr. 4, 2010). 
 114. Id. 
 115. VICIOUS CYCLE, supra note 110, at 2 (“As household wealth has declined in the down-
turn, more American families are facing financial distress due to high debt burdens.  In 2007, before 
the recession began, 14.7 percent of U.S. families had debt exceeding 40 percent of their income.”). 
 116. TAMARA DRAUT, ECONOMIC STATE OF YOUNG AMERICA (Spring 2008), available at 
http://www.demos.org/pubs/esya_web.pdf.  The average college graduate has nearly $20,000 in 
debt.  Though student loan debt accounts for a great deal of this amount, the average credit card debt 
has increased 47% between 1989 and 2004 for twenty-five to thirty-four-year-olds and 11% for 
eighteen to twenty-four-year-olds.  Nearly one in five eighteen to twenty-four-year-old is in “debt 
hardship,” up from 12% in 1989.  Student loan debt, also higher and dramatically more common in 
this generation, furthers credit card debt problems.  Today’s twenty- and thirty-somethings are rely-
ing more on credit cards to cover basic living expenses.  Id. at 13. 
 117. Woolsey & Schulz, supra note 113. 
 118. Woolsey & Schulz, supra note 113. 
 119. Id. Only 17% of surveyed college students said they regularly paid off all cards each 
month, and another 1% had parents, a spouse, or other family members paying the bill.  The remain-
ing 82% carried balances and, thus, incurred finance charges each month.  Id. 
 120. DĒMOS.ORG: A NETWORK FOR IDEAS AND ACTION, GENERATION DEBT: STUDENT 
LOANS, CREDIT CARDS, AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 2 (Winter 2007), available at 
http://www.demos.org/pubs/yaes_web_debt.pdf. 
 121. Id. at 3.  Young Americans now have the second highest rate of bankruptcy, just after 
those aged thirty-five to forty-four.  The rate among twenty-five to thirty-four-year-olds increased 
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mingly large portion of their incomes on debt.122  If people in their mid-
twenties are so much worse off than the members of the Baby Boomer 
generation were at the same age, imagine how today’s young children 
will fare when they reach young adulthood.  At younger and younger 
ages,123 children are drawn in to an earn-and-spend economic lifestyle, in 
which the attainment of material possessions is the most important indi-
cator of success.124  While most minors spend their money on food, 
clothing, and entertainment, larger purchases are occurring with greater 
frequency.125  The prospect of large purchases, which means greater fi-
nancial obligations and longer-term commitments, shows a greater need 
to ensure that minors are well-informed and capable of consenting before 
they are held to their contracts. 
The infancy defense plays an important role in protecting children 
because it is difficult for parents to monitor their children’s consumer 
behavior.  Although numerous filters exist and are used to block certain 
content from kids,126 it remains difficult for parents to truly control their 
children’s Internet use, and both parents and teens agree that teens often 
behave unwisely on the Internet.127  This tendency, in combination with 
                                                                                                                                     
between 1991 and 2001, indicating that this generation is more likely to file bankruptcy as young 
adults than when young boomers were the same age.  Id. at 4. 
 122. Id. 
The rise in credit card debt, coupled with the surge in student loan debt, is the main rea-
son why today’s young adults are spending much more on debt payments than the pre-
vious generation.  On average, 25-to-34-year-olds spend nearly 25 cents out of every dol-
lar of income on debt payments, according to the Federal Reserve’s data.  That’s more 
than double what Baby Boomers of the same age spent on debt payments in 1989.  The 
fact that young adults are already spending a quarter of their income on debt is particular-
ly worrisome because most in the 25 to 34 age group aren’t homeowners.  So that 25 
cents is going to nonmortgage debt: primarily student loans, car loans, and credit cards. 
Id. 
 123. SCHOR, supra note 2. 
 124. SCHOR, supra note 2. 
 125. Katharine Tengtio, Teens as Major Consumers?, WASHINGTON STATE OFFICE OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, Aug. 1, 2008, http://www.atg.wa.gov/BlogPost.aspx?id=20570#-.  Although 
teens are saving, teens are also avidly spending.  Generally, most of their money goes towards 
clothes, MP3 players, athletic equipment, and cell phones.  On a more expensive scale though, teens 
are also buying cars for the first time, purchasing laptops for school, opening their first bank ac-
counts, renting an apartment for the first time, and obtaining new credit cards.  Id. 
 126. Amanda Lenhart, Protecting Teens Online, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, 
2 (Mar. 17, 2005) http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2005/PIP_Filters_Report.pdf. 
[T]he use of filters has grown significantly in internet-using households with minor tee-
nagers . . . .  More than half (54%) of internet-connected families with teens now use fil-
ters . . . .  Given the overall growth in the internet-using population of teenagers, this 
means that the use of filters in families with teens has grown 65% in four years, from 
around 7 million users at the end of 2000, to close to 12 million today. 
Id. at 2. 
 127. Id. at 3.  According to a 2004 study of twelve to seventeen-year-olds and their parents, 
81% of parents of online teens say that teens are not careful enough when giving out information 
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the fact that most online behavior is unsupervised, poses a real risk that 
minors will agree to unfair bargains.  The risk of minors agreeing to un-
fair bargains is exacerbated by the more-than-arm’s-length nature of con-
tracts that are typical online, such as adhesion contracts in the form of 
clickwrap agreements, as the contract terms are not obvious.  Without 
anyone to watch over their online activities, minors need some form of 
protection when they enter into unwise contracts.  The infancy defense 
provides this protection. 
The infancy defense may be an old doctrine, but it is important to 
retain it in modern society.  Children are growing up in a world where 
they are statistically likely to spend their entire adult lives attempting to 
get out of debt.  They are captive audiences, sitting unsupervised in front 
of computer screens, and large companies have spent a great deal of 
money on an onslaught of advertising designed to appeal to them.  Child-
ren sit confidently in front of these screens, perhaps more confidently 
than their grandparents or parents; however, even intelligent and mature 
minors do not know how to deal with common practices in contract for-
mation.  They are not experienced enough, and their brains are not de-
veloped enough, to recognize which risks are worth taking.  These child-
ren could be accepting offers for credit cards with pictures of innocuous 
Disney characters while being unaware that they are being charged inter-
est rates over 20%.  Without the infancy defense protecting minors, there 
will be little reason for corporate restraint. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Because the infancy defense protects youth in the face of commer-
cialization and unfair bargaining power, courts should continue to recog-
nize it.  America’s youth are subject to a tremendous amount of targeted 
advertising, and they are growing into an extremely materialistic, brand-
oriented generation.  The level of consumerism at young ages that exists 
in society currently is unprecedented, meaning children are easier to 
draw in.  Additionally, the amount of bargaining power held by the aver-
age consumer is at an all-time low, and even large contracts are entered 
into without negotiation.  This problem is magnified when the consumer 
is a minor because children have not developed the cognitive capacity 
necessary to contract in the modern marketplace. 
The infancy defense is not perfect, but the arguments against it are 
unpersuasive.  There are already significant protections for adults who 
deal with minors through the common exceptions to the infancy law doc-
                                                                                                                                     
about themselves online; 79% of online teens agree that teens are not careful enough when sharing 
personal information online; and 65% of all parents and 64% of all teens say that teens do things 
online that they would not want their parents to know about.  Id. at 3. 
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trine.  Removing the infancy defense could lead corporations to abandon 
any restraint they exercise in targeting minors.  Without the threat of dis-
affirmance, there is little reason not to entice minors into contracts that 
are not in their best interests.  These contracts will result not only in 
short-term difficulties for those children and their parents, but also, on a 
larger scale, will contribute to tremendous consumer debt and the propa-
gation of harmful financial practices for an entire generation. 
